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Economists have long puzzled over the astounding differences in productivity between firms 
and countries. For example, looking at disaggregated data on U.S. manufacturing industries, 
Syverson (2004a) found that plants at the 90th percentile produced four times as much as the 
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“Bakeries and Tortilla Manufacturing” or “Plastics Product Manufacturing.” Foster, 
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within very homogeneous goods industries such as boxes and block ice. Some of these 
productivity differences across firms and plants are temporary, but in large part they persist 
over time. At the country level, Hall and Jones (1999) and Jones and Romer (2009) show 
how the stark differences in productivity across countries account for a substantial fraction of 
the differences in average per capita income. Both at the plant level and at the national level, 
differences in productivity are typically calculated as a residual—that is, productivity is 
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Economists have long puzzled why there are such astounding differences in productivity 
between firms and countries. For example, looking as disaggregated data on U.S. 
manufacturing industries, Syverson (2004a) found that plants at the 90th percentile 
produced four times as much as the plant in the 10th percentile on a per-employee basis. 
Only half of this difference in labor productivity could be accounted for by differential 
inputs, such as capital intensity. Syverson looked at industries defined at the four-digit 
level in the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system (now the North American 
Industry Classification System or NAICS) like “Bakeries and Tortilla Manufacturing” or 
“Plastics Product Manufacturing.” Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2009) show large 
differences in total factor productivity even within very homogeneous goods industries 
such as cement and block ice. Some of these productivity differences across firms and 
plants are temporary, but in large part they persist over time. At the country level, Hall 
and Jones (1999) and Jones and Romer (2009) show how the stark differences in 
productivity across countries account for a substantial fraction of the differences in 
average per capita income. 
 
Both at the plant level and at the national level, differences in productivity are typically 
calculated as a residual - that is, productivity is inferred as the gap between output and 
inputs that cannot be accounted for by conventionally measured inputs. For this reason, 
Abramovitz (1956) labeled total factor productivity at the country level “a measure of our 
ignorance.” Productivity differences at the firm level have long been a measure of our 
ignorance, too. For example, one potential hypothesis has been that persistent 
productivity differentials are due to “hard” technological innovations as embodied in 
patents or adoption of new machinery. Although there has been substantial progress in 
improving our measures of technology, there remain substantial productivity differences 
even after controlling for such factors.  
 
In this paper, we present evidence on another possible explanation for persistent 
differences in productivity at the firm and the national level—namely, that such 
differences largely reflect variations in management practices. As two British-born 
academics, we are accustomed to reports that blame Britain’s relatively low productivity 
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on bad management. Indeed, this view is so common in the UK that it has generated a 
vibrant export industry of TV shows on bad management in manufacturing (“The 
Office”), private services (“Fawlty Towers”), and the public sector (“Yes, Minister”). 
Now that “The Office” has been so successfully imported into the US, this raises the 
question as to whether Michael Scott (the infamously bad American manager in the 
show) is representative of US firms? 
 
But while ascribing differences in productivity to management practices has long been 
popular for TV shows, business schools and policy makers, it has been less popular 
among economists for two broad reasons. First, much of the management literature is 
based on case studies, rather than on systematic empirical data across firms and countries. 
To tackle this problem we have, over the last decade, undertaken a large survey research 
program to systematically measure management practices across firms, industries and 
countries. We begin by describing our survey approach, which focuses on aspects of 
management like systematic performance monitoring, setting appropriate targets and 
providing incentives for good performance.   
 
A second reason that economists have tended to shy away from management-based 
explanations for productivity differences is a sense that changing management seems a 
relatively straightforward process. To be sure, there are always adjustment costs and 
agency costs, but if we are correct about the substantial size of the potential gains from 
improved management, it seems as if such barriers should be surmountable. In turn, this 
insight suggests that perhaps management differences are rooted in deeper informational, 
social, legal and technological differences. Thus, once we have explained how we 
measure management and identified some basic patterns in our data, we turn to the 
question of why management practices vary so much across firms and nations. What we 
find is a combination of imperfectly competitive markets, family ownership of firms, 
regulations restricting management practices, and informational barriers, allow bad 
management to persist.  
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As a foretaste of our argument, here are ten conclusions we will discuss in this paper 
based on our management data. 
 
First, firms with “better” management practices tend to have better performance on a 
wide range of dimensions: they are larger, more productive, grow faster and have higher 
survival rates.  
 
Second, management practices vary tremendously across firms and countries. Most of the 
difference in the average management score of a country is due to the size of the “long 
tail” of very badly managed firms. For example, relatively few U.S. firms are very badly 
managed, while Brazil and India have many firms in that category.  
 
Third, countries and firms specialize in different styles of management. For example, 
American firms score much higher than Swedish firms in incentives but are worse than 
Swedish firms in monitoring.  
 
Fourth, strong product market competition appears to boost average management 
practices through a combination of eliminating the tail of badly managed firms and 
pushing incumbents to improve their practices. 
 
Fifth, multinationals are generally well managed in every country. They also transplant 
their management styles abroad. For example, US multinationals located in the UK are 
better at incentives and worse at monitoring than Swedish multinationals in the UK. 
 
Sixth, firms that export (but do not produce) overseas are better managed than domestic 
non-exporters, but are worse managed than multinationals. 
 
Seventh, inherited family owned firms who appoint a chief executive officer as a family 
member (especially the eldest son) are very badly managed on average.  
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Eighth, government owned firms are typically managed extremely badly. Firms with 
publicly quoted share prices or owned by private-equity firms are typically well 
managed. 
 
Ninth, firms that more intensively use human capital, as measured by more educated 
workers, tend to have much better management practices. 
 
Tenth, at the country level, a relatively light touch in labor market regulation is associated 
with better incentives management. 
   
We hope and expect that these findings will be tested and refined as research continues in 
the area of quantitative analysis of management practices. At the end of the paper, we 
suggest some directions for future research, and offer some broader discussion of 
interpreting the quality of management both as shaped by national factors and as 
reflecting the decisions of firms.  
 
 
How Can Management Practices Be Measured? 
 
To measure management practices, we have developed a new survey methodology 
described in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). We use an interview-based evaluation tool 
that defines and scores from one (“worst practice”) to five (“best practice”) 18 basic 
management practices on a scoring grid from one to five. Table 1 lists the 18 
management practices, and also gives some sense of how each is measured on a scale 
from 1 to 5. In our view, a high score represents a best practice in the sense that a firm 
which has adopted the practice will, on average, increase their productivity. The 
combination of many of these indicators reflects “good management” as commonly 
understood, with our main measure of management practices simply the average of these 
18 scores.  
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This evaluation tool was developed by an international consulting firm, and it can be 
broadly interpreted as attempting to measure management practices in three broad areas. 
First, monitoring - how well do companies monitor what goes on inside their firms, and 
use this for continuous improvement. Second, targets - do companies set the right targets, 
track the right outcomes and take appropriate action if the two are inconsistent. Third, 
incentives - are companies promoting and rewarding employees based on performance, 
and trying to hire and keep their best employees?1  
 
We hired MBA students to carry out the interviews because they generally had some 
business experience and training. The survey was targeted at plant managers, who are 
senior enough to have an overview of management practices but not so senior as to be 
detached from day-to-day operations. We interviewed these production plant managers 
using what we call a “double-blind” technique. 
 
One part of this double-blind technique is that managers are not told they are being 
scored or shown the scoring grid. They are only told they are being “interviewed about 
management practices.” To do this we used open questions in the survey. For example, 
on the first monitoring dimension we start by asking the open question “tell me how you 
monitor your production process”, rather than closed questions such as “do you monitor 
your production daily [yes/no]”. We continue with open questions focusing on actual 
practices and examples until the interviewer can make an accurate assessment of the 
firm’s practices. For example, the second question on that performance tracking 
dimension is “what kinds of measures would you use to track performance?” and the 
third is “If I walked round your factory what could I tell about how each person was 
performing?” The combined response to this dimension are scored against a grid which 
goes from 1 (out of 5) which is defined as “Measures tracked do not indicate directly if 
overall business objectives are being met. Tracking is an ad-hoc process (certain 
processes aren’t tracked at all).” up to 5 which is defined as “Performance is 
                                                 
1 These practices are similar to those emphasized in earlier work on management practices, by for example 
Ichinowski, Prennushi and Shaw (1997) and Black and Lynch (2001). Bertrand and Schoar (2003) focus on 
another important angle – the management style of chief executive officers and chief financial officers— 
which will capture differences in management strategy (say over mergers and acquisitions) rather than 
management practices per se. 
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continuously tracked and communicated, both formally and informally, to all staff using a 
range of visual management tools.” The full list of dimensions and questions used to 
score theses are given in Bloom and Van Reenen (2006).  
 
The other side of our “double-blind” approach is that our interviewers are not told in 
advance anything about the firm’s performance. They are only provided with the 
company name, telephone number and industry. We randomly sample medium-sized 
firms, employing between 100 to 5,000 workers. These firms are large enough that the 
type of systematic management practices chosen are likely to matter. However, these 
firms are small enough that they are not usually reported in the business press, and so the 
interviewers generally have not heard of these firms before, so should have no 
preconceptions. By contrast, interviewer preconceptions might be more of a problem if 
the interviewers knew they were talking to an employee of well-known firms like  
General Electric, Boeing or Honda. 
 
We used a variety of procedures to obtain a high success rate and to remove potential 
sources of bias from our estimates. First, we obtained government endorsements for the 
surveys in each country covered. Second, we positioned the surveys as a “piece of work 
on Lean manufacturing,” never using the word “survey” or “research”, as telephone 
switchboards usually block surveys and market research. Third, we never ask 
interviewees for financial data, instead obtaining such data from independent sources or 
company accounts. Fourth, the interviewers were encouraged to be persistent – so they 
ran about two interviews a day lasting 45 minutes each on average, with the rest of the 
time spent repeatedly contacting managers to schedule interviews. These steps helped to 
yield a 44 percent response rate which was uncorrelated with the (independently 
collected) performance measures for the firm—thus, we were not disproportionately 
interviewing successful or failing firms.2 We also collected a series of “noise controls” on 
                                                 
2 As one step to validate our survey data, we re-surveyed 5 percent of the sample using a second 
interviewer to independently survey a second plant manager in the same firm. Two independent 
management interviews on different plants within the same firms should help to reveal how consistently we 
are measuring management practices. We found that in the sample of 222 additional interviews the 
correlation between our independently run first and second interview scores was 0.51. Part of this 
difference across plants within the same firms is likely to be real internal variations in management 
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the interview process itself (such as the time of day and the day of the week), 
characteristics of the interviewee and the identity of the interviewer. Including these in 
our regression analysis typically helps to improve the precision of our estimates by 
stripping out some of the measurement error. 
 
 
International Patterns of Management and Productivity  
 
In discussing the patterns we find in our management data, it is important to remember 
that our main data is essentially cross sectional—across many firms and countries at 
roughly the same point in time—and so clearly establishing the causal effect of how 
changes in management affect productivity is not possible. A wealth of field experiments, 
surveyed in Lazear and Oyer (2009), does strongly suggest the importance of incentive-
based pay for productivity. Nevertheless, examining both the patterns of management 
across countries and the correlation between our measures of management and various 
measures of firm performance is an important first step in determining the extent to 
which our measurements of management are economically meaningful.  
 
International Patterns of Management 
 
The average management practice score across countries from the almost 6,000 
interviews on different firms we have carried out since 2006 appear in Figure 1. These 
firms were randomly sampled from the population of all public and private firms 
manufacturing firms with 100 to 5,000 employees. The median firm in every country is 
privately owned employing around 350 workers and operating across two production 
plants. 
 
The United States has the highest management practice scores on average, followed by 
the Germans, Japanese, Swedes and Canadians, and then followed by a block of mid-
                                                                                                                                                 
practices, with the rest presumably reflecting survey measurement error. However, the correlation across 
the two interviews is highly significant (p-value 0.001), which suggests that while our management score is 
clearly noisy, it is picking up significant management differences across firms. 
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European countries (France, Italy, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Poland) and 
Australia. At the bottom are countries in Southern Europe (Greece and Portugal) along 
with developing countries like Brazil, China and India.  
 
We can separate these overall management scores into three broad categories: scores 
related to monitoring, targets and incentives, with country level scores shown in Table 2.. 
For ease of comparison, average scores are given in the bottom row of the table. U.S. 
management has by far the largest advantage in incentives (with Canada and Germany 
following), and the second-largest advantage in the category of monitoring and target-
setting (behind Sweden and Germany respectively). However, this data also describes 
how management styles differ across countries. In the United States, India and China, 
managerial use of incentives (relative to the average country) are substantially greater 
than their use of monitoring and target-setting (relative to the average). However, in 
Japan, Sweden and Germany, managerial use of monitoring and target setting (relative to 
the average) far exceeds their use of incentives (relative to the average). There could be 
many reasons for this pattern of specialization across countries. One factor we will 
examine below is that the lighter labor market regulations in the United States make it 
easier to remove poor performers and to reward high performers. 
 
What does the distribution of management practices look like within countries? We can 
plot a firm-level histogram of management practices by country, as shown in Figure 2. 
The first histogram shows this data for the United States, where the bars show the actual 
data and the dark line is a smoothed (kernel) fit of the data. Other advanced economies in 
Western Europe, Japan, Canada, and Australia have some resemblence to the US 
distribution, except they have a somewhat thicker “tail” of badly managed firms. To 
illustrate this we show the histograms of France and “Southern Europe” (Portugal and 
Greece). These diagrams also show the smoothed value for the U.S. economy, so that 
management in these countries can be readily compared to the United States. Histograms 
for Brazil and India shows that although they both have numerous well managed firms, 
their average firms have much lower management scores than the US. Finally, China has 
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a more compressed distribution, possibly because Chinese firms are much younger so 
have less variation in terms of vinatages of management practices.  
 
In one sense this cross-country ranking is not surprising, since it approximates the cross-
country productivity ranking. Although we cannot offer a rigorous argument here about 
the magnitude of any causal effect, it certainly appears plausible that management 
practices should be viewed as part of the determinants of national productivity. A 
regression of GDP per capita on management practices across the sample of 17 countries 
yields an R-squared of 0.81. Since some of this is simply a contrast between more and 
less developed countries, focusing the regression on the 11 OECD nations with good 
manufacturing productivity data (Inklaar and Timmer, 2008) yields an R-squared of 0.66. 
Either way, management practices appear quantitatively important. 
 
Countries can improve average management practices and therefore aggregate 
productivity in two distinct ways. The first is by promoting factors that increase average 
management quality in each firm (say through better business education) and therefore 
raising productivity within the average firm. The next sub-section relates to this 
mechanism.  
 
The second is through improved reallocation across firms. Empirically this turns out to 
be important in explaining cross-country differences in aggregate productivity –high 
productivity countries like the US appear to be better at getting efficient firms to grow 
larger, while low productivity countries like China and India are not (Hsieh and Klenow, 
2009). The implication is that factors like product market competition should generate a 
stronger relationship between management quality on the one hand and firm size and 
growth on the other, and therefore lead to higher aggregate productivity. We discuss this 
later when we turn to the determination of management practices.  
 
 
Associations Between Management Quality and Firm Performance 
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We examined the correlation between our measure of management practices and firm 
performance in terms of productivity, profitability, growth rates, survival rates and 
market value. For these measures of firm performance, we used company accounts data 
which were available for 3,380 of the firms. We found that for our sample of 
manufacturing firms, higher management scores are robustly associated with better 
performance.3  
 
Table 2 reports the results of some ordinary least squares regressions. Our dependent 
variables are different measures of firm performance, including sales per employee, 
profitability, Tobin’s q (the ratio of a firm’s stock market value to its capital stock), the 
growth of sales and survival. Our key explanatory variable is the measure of the 
company’s management quality. In some of the regressions, we also adjust for capital per 
employee, and the share of the workforce with a college degree. We also employ other 
control variables including country and industry dummy variables, firm-level control 
variables for hours worked and firm age, and a set of “noise controls” that (as discussed 
earlier) take include a dummy variables for our interviewers, as well as for the job tenure 
of the manager, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the 
interview was conducted, the length of the interview, and a judgment from the 
interviewer on the reliability of the information collected.  
 
In Column 1, the dependent variable is the logarithm of sales per employee, a very basic 
measure of firm productivity. Our management score is an average across all 18 
questions. The coefficient suggests that firms with one point higher average management 
score have about 45 log points (about 57 percent) higher labor productivity. So a one-
standard deviation change in management (of 0.664) is associated with about a 38 percent 
increase in sales holding employment constant. Column 2 controls for country and 
industry to reflect different accounting standards and prices across countries and 
industries. The management coefficient drops in magnitude to 0.208, but remains highly 
                                                 
3 Our sample contained 90 percent private firms and 10 percent publicly listed firms. In most countries 
around the world, both public and private firms publish basic accounts. In the United States, Canada and 
India, however, private firms do not publish (sufficiently detailed) accounts, so while we still surveyed 
these firms no accounting performance data is available for them. Hence, these performance regressions 
use data for all firms except privately held ones in the United States, Canada and India. 
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significant. Column 3 adds controls for capital per employee, the percentage of the 
workforce with a college degree, and our controls for survey “noise”. These additions 
slightly reduce the coefficient on the management variable to around 0.172, because 
better managed firms tend to have more fixed capital and human capital. These 
correlations are not simply driven by the “Anglo-Saxon” countries, as one might suspect 
if the measures were culturally biased. The relationship between productivity and 
management is strong across all regions in the data. 
 
In Column 4 of Table 2 we look at profitability as measured by return on capital 
employed (defined as profits over equity plus debt capital) and find that this is about 1.8 
percentage points higher for every one point increase in the management score. In 
Column 5 we look at Tobin’s q for the subsample of publicly quoted firms (where 
Tobin’s q is calculated as the stock market value of the firm divided by the book value of 
the firm) and find a one-point increase in management is associated with a 15 log point 
increase in Tobin’s q. Column 6 uses the five-year sales growth rate as the outcome. 
Here, a unit improvement in the management practice score is associated with 4.4 percent 
higher annual sales growth. Finally, Column 7 looks at the post-survey survival rates 
shows that better managed firms are more likely to survive, while worse managed firms 
are more likely to go bankrupt. 
 
Another key measure of performance is firm size; in equilibrium, better-managed firms 
should be larger (Lucas, 1978). This is partly because the market will allocate these firms 
a greater share of sales, but also because larger firms have the resources and incentives to 
employ better management. When we plotted average management score against the 
number of employees in a firm (as a measure of firm size) we found that firm with 100-
200 employees had average management scores of about 2.7. The management score then 
rose steadily with firm size, so that firms with 2000-5000 employees—the largest firms in 
our sample—had average management scores of about 3.2.  
 
The international data revealed some patterns of specialization by country in management 
style, in term of whether management in certain countries places a higher relative weight 
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on monitoring and target-setting or on incentives. Although, a firm which is good at one 
dimension of management tends to be good at all (that is, the answers to the individual 
questions tend to be positively correlated), a pattern of specialization in different styles of 
management is also observable at the firm level. However, the relative specialization in 
incentives tends to be stronger for firms and industries that are more human capital 
intensive (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). So firms operating in industries like 
pharmaceuticals that are relatively human-capital intensive, tend to have better incentive 
management practices than firms operating in industries textiles and apparel that have 
more unskilled workers. 
 
The association of management with firm performance is also clear in other sectors 
outside manufacturing. In Bloom, Propper, Seiler and Van Reenen (2009), we 
interviewed 181 managers and physicians in the orthopedic and cardiology departments 
of UK hospitals. We found that management scores were significantly associated with 
better performance as indicated by improved survival rates from emergency heart attack 
admissions and other kinds of general surgery as well as shorter waiting lists. 
 
Might better management also be associated with worse outcomes for workers and for the 
environment? In an earlier 2004 survey wave we also collected information on aspects of 
work-life balance such as child-care facilities, job flexibility and self-assessed employee 
satification. Well-managed firms actually tended to have better facilities for workers 
along these dimensions (Bloom, Kretschmer and Van Reenen, 2009). We also found that 
energy efficency is strongly associated with better firm-level management, because good 
management practices (like Lean manufacturing) tend to economize on energy use 
(Bloom, Genakos, Martin, and Sadun, 2008). 
 
What Causes Differences in Management Practices? 
 
Management practices vary substantially across countries and across firms, which raises a 
difficult question. If improved management offers profitability gains, why would firms 
not adopt better management practices? To address this we focus on product market 
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competition, labor regulation, multinational status, ownership and education. Of course, 
some of these reasons may be better suited to explaining differences within countries or 
across industries, while other reasons may be better-suited to explaining difference 
between countries. 
 
Product Market Competition 
 
When product market competition is not very intense, some low productivity firms will 
be able to survive. This insight is consistent with our earlier argument that the United 
States, which generally has very competitive product markets by international standards, 
does not have as much of a tail of badly-managed firms as some other countries. 
Syverson (2004b) showed that in a very homogeneous industry in the US (ready mix 
concrete); more competitive geographic markets had a smaller tail of less productive 
plants. 
 
In our surveys, we asked managers how many competitors they faced, and found the 
average management score was significantly higher when firms reported facing more 
competitors. Using other measures of competition not reported by managers, like the 
import penetration rates (measured by imports as a share of domestic production) or 
Lerner indices of competition yields a similar general result that management quality 
tends to increase with competitive intensity.4  
 
In general, we interpret this finding as showing that competitive product markets are 
associated with better management practices. This result could arise through a variety of 
channels. For example, one route for competition to improve management practices may 
be through selection, with badly run firms exiting more speedily in competitive markets. 
A second route may be through incentives to improve practices, which could be sharper 
when competition “raises the stakes” either because efficiency improvements have a 
                                                 
4  The Lerner index is one minus the average profits/sales ratio of all other firms in the country industry cell 
over the last 5 years. High values suggest low long-run profits, suggestive of tough competition. When we 
used this and the import measure data we add country and industry dummies to control for things like 
country size and different reporting requirements – see Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) for details. 
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larger impact on shifting market share or because managers are more fearful of losing 
their jobs. In ongoing work (Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2009) we appear 
to find evidence that both effects are at play. On the selection story, the relationship 
between management and firm growth appeared to be particularly strong in the US where 
competition is more intense. Further, using our short panel data for four countries we 
found that increases in competition were associated with increases in management quality 
for surviving firms. 
 
In any case, the bottom line is that encouraging tougher competition should improve 
average management practices. 
  
Labor Market Regulation 
 
Labor market regulations that constrain the ability of managers to hire, fire, pay and 
promote employees could reduce the quality of management practices. Figure 3 plots 
each countries average management scores on incentives management (questions 7 and 
13 to 18 on hiring, firing, pay and promotions) against an employment rigidity index 
from the World Bank, which focuses on the difficulties that firms face in hiring workers, 
firing workers and changing their hours and pay.  Tougher labor markets regulation is 
significantly negatively correlated with the management scores on incentives. In contrast, 
more restrictive labor market regulations are not significantly correlated with 
management practices in other dimensions like monitoring or targets. 
 
Obviously a number of other factors also vary across countries, so the pattern shown in 
Figure 3 does not conclusively demonstrate labor market regulations constrain some 
forms of management practices — but it is certainly supportive of this effect.  
 
Ownership and Meritocratic Selection of the Chief Executive Officer 
 
The firms in our sample can be divided up by ultimate ownership: including dispersed 
shareholders, family ownership with an external chief executive officer, family 
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ownership with a family chief executive officer; owned by the founder, the government 
or the managers of the firm; and owned by private equity or private individuals. Figure 4 
plots a firm-level histogram by ultimate ownership category. The bars display the 
distribution of management practices within ownership group. The dotted line is the 
kernel density for dispersed shareholders – which is the most common ownership 
category in the United States – for comparison. The differences shown across the 
categories are not primarily explained by differences in countries or in type of industry.  
  
One interesting group are the family firms, which is defined in our research as firms 
owned by the descendants of the founder (so sons, daugthers, grandsons etc). Those that 
are family owned and also family managed (“Family, family CEO”) have a large tail of 
badly managed firms, while the family owned but externally managed (“Family, external 
CEO”) look very similar to dispersed shareholders. The reason appears to be that many 
family firms typically adopt a rule of primogeniture, so that the eldest son becomes the 
chief executive officer, regardless of talent considerations. Many governments around the 
world also provide strong tax subsidies for family firms; for example, the United 
Kingdom has many more family-run owned firms than the United States and Germany, 
which is likely to be related to the estate tax exemption for inherited business assets in the 
United Kingdom.  
 
Since family firms typically have less debt, product market competition may not be as 
effective in driving them out of business if they are badly managed. Without debt firms 
only have to cover operating costs (e.g. salaries and wages) but not capital costs (e.g. the 
rent on property or equipment since these were typically bought outright many years 
ago). Hence, family firms can continue to generate positive cash-flow while generating 
economic losses, because their family owners are subsidizing them through cheap capital. 
  
Firms owned by private equity appear well managed, in particular when compared to 
family and government-owned firms (Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2009b). Thus, the 
pattern in recent years of private equity firms purchasing firms in Europe and Asia that 
were previously under family or government management makes some economic sense.  
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A perhaps surprising result is that “Founder firms”—where the current chief executive 
officer founded the firm—are also badly managed. We are still trying to understand this 
phenomenon, but one potential explanation is that the entreprenuerial skills required of a 
start up (e.g. creativity and risk taking) are not the primary skills required when a firm 
grows large enough to enter our sample (at least 100 employees). A mature firm needs to 
move beyond informal rules and these may be implemented more effectively by a 
professional manager.  
 
We have also examined how the distribution across these ownership categories varies 
across countries, since ownership can account for up to 40% of cross-country differences 
in management practices.5 In particular, we focused on the three ownership categories 
associated with the lowest management scores in our sample: family firms with a family 
chief executive officer, founder firms, and government-owned firms. In developed 
economies like Germany, Japan, Sweden and the United States, these categories as a 
group make up about 20 to 30 percent of the sampled firms. By contrast, around three-
quarters of our Indian firms are owned either by the firm’s founder or one of his 
descendants. In Italy, Brazil, Portugal, and Greece, the share of firms in our sample that 
fall into these three categories is roughly 60 percent.  
 
One likely explanation for this difference is that the underdevelopment of financial 
markets and poor rule of law in many developing countries makes the separation of 
ownership and control extremely difficult. For example, families may be reluctant to hire 
outside managers because the law is not strong enough to protect them from theft (La 
Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
 
Multinationals and Exporters 
 
                                                 
5 For example, including a full set of dummies for different ownership types reduces the R-squared of 
country dummies in firm-level management regressions by 40%. This suggests about 40% of the cross-
country variation in management is associated with differences in ownership. 
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Figure 5 plots the management scores by country for domestic firms (those with no 
production facilities abroad) and foreign multinationals. Two results stand out. First, 
foreign multinationals are better managed than domestic firms, presumably reflecting the 
selection on management in becoming a multinational. Second, foreign multinationals 
seem able to partially “transport” their better practices abroad despite often difficult local 
circumstances (see Burstein and Monge, who have a model consistent with these 
findings). We also find that multinationals transplant other features of their organizational 
form overseas such as the average degree of decentralization (Bloom, Sadun and Van 
Reenen, 2009a).  We also distinguished by export status. Consistent with the predictions 
of papers such as Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) there is a pecking order: average 
management scores were lowest for non-exporters (2.6), next lowest for non-





Education is strongly correlated with high management scores is the education levels of 
the workers and managers. We cannot infer a causal relationship from this association, of 
course, but it is plausible that managers with an MBA or college education are more 
likely to be aware of the benefits of modern management practices like Lean 
manufacturing. More surprisingly perhaps, is that worker level education is also 
positively associated with management scores, suggesting that implementing many of 
these practices may be easier when the workforce is more knowledgeable. Many of the 
best practices in Table 1 require significant initiative from workers, such as the Japanese 
inspried lean manufacturing techniques and higher powered incentives. 
 
Our belief is that more basic business education – for example around capital budgeting, 
data analysis, and standard human resources practices – could help improve management 
in many countries. This holds particularly true in developing countries, and recent field 





The slow evolvion of management practices across the US, Europe and Japan - from 
Taylor's “Scientific Management”, to Ford's mass production, Sloan’s M-form 
corporation, Demming's quality movement, and Toyota's “Lean production” - suggest 
management practices do have a resemblence to process technologies that diffuse slowly 
over time. Slow technological diffusion ocan have many causes (e.g. see Hall, 2003, for a 
survey), but a well studied factor is information. New management practices are often 
complex and hard to introduce without the assistance of employees or consultants with 
prior experience of these. Firms learn from the experiences (good and bad) of others in 
experimenting with different practices, so not all will adopt immediately (e.g. Acemoglu, 
Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen and Zilibotti, 2007). An example is the two decade 
struggle of US automotive firms to replicate the Japanese Lean manufacturing system. 
 
In our survey we directly ask managers the question “Excluding yourself, how well 
managed would you say your firm is on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is worst practice, 10 is 
best practice and 5 is average”. We find firms give us an average score of 7.1 – well 
above what should be the average – and this score is uncorrelated with either the 
management score we give them or their firm’s own performance on the dimensions in 
Table 3 such as productivity and profitability. Hence, this is suggests that managers are 
not well informed about how good their own management practices are and which areas 
need improvement.  
 
A project we have been involved in India attempts to test from another angle by taking a 
sample of textile firms and providing a randomly sub-group with free management 
consulting and comparing this to a control group without assistance (see Bloom, Eifert, 
Mahajan, McKenzie and Roberts, 2009). We find changes in management practices are 
associated with significant improvement in performance, and the reason firms most 
frequently suggested for not introducing these practices earlier was simply “lack of 
awareness” of these. Again, this suggests that improved management practices are a type 





Thus far we have been assuming that there are some type of management practices that 
are, on average productivity enhancing. From this perspective, management resembles a 
technology and there can be technical progress in management, just as there is for 
machines. An alternative perspective is that all management practices are contingent on 
the firm’s environment (e.g. Woodward, 1958). Every firm is optimally adopting its own 
best practices given the circumstance it finds itself in.   
 
There is certainly some element of contingency in management choices in at least three 
respects. First, different firms (and indeed countries) specialize in different aspects of the 
managerial practices. For example, Japan focuses more on monitoring than 
incentives/people management. Firms in highly skilled industries and/or with lighter 
labor market regulations focus relatively more on incentives/people management than on 
monitoring. Second, many aspects of strategic management – such as pricing or takeover 
decisions – will be very contingent on specific circumstances with no typical “good” or 
“bad” practice—which is why our survey looks only at a subset of the more process-
oriented management practices where it appears there is a more universal set of “good” 
practices. Third, the management practices we use have not been equally beneficial 
throughout history. For example, rigorously and systematically using data to deal with 
problems and make decisions is facilitated by the dramatic fall in the real cost of 
information technology. 
 
But with these elements of contingency readily acknowledged, our work suggests that 
this is not the whole story. As Table 2 showed better managed firms within the same 
country and industry are earning more profits, growing faster and have higher stock 
market valuations. This is hard to square with the idea that all the differences in 
management practices reflecting optimal responses to different circumstances.  
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It seems likely that many aspects of management style are not contingent. Certain 
practices like basing promotion largely on nepotism or keeping workers at the same job 
without any regard at all to a worker’s performance are unlikely to be productivity-
enhancing in any economy. In every country in our survey, multinationals do bring a 
stronger management approach, even though the multinationals need to work with most 
of the same constraints that domestic firms face. Business education does seem to 
improve management in developing countries, which suggests that contingency is not 




Empirical research in the economics of management is at an early stage, and there are 
several areas of particular interest for future research. Here are a few: 
 
Field experiments to alter management practices and then attempt to identify the causal 
change on firm performance. One form of intervention is some type of outside 
consultancy advice. Some ongoing work on randomized control trials in Indian textile 
firms is attempting to establish causality using management consultancy treatments 
(Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts, 2009). 
 
Links to theories of management. Many of the correlations that we have discussed, such 
as the positive association of size and productivity with management quality, and the 
positive impact of competition on management are common to a number of theories of 
management, but not all. Other findings may spur the development of new theories and a 
more structural link between the theory and data.  
 
Management panel data would be a useful supplement to our data, most of which is 
cross-sectional. We have built a small panel on the same firms over time and as this goes 
forward we will be able to observe the dynamics of managerial change and make stronger 
statements about cause and effect. Many of the workhorse theory models assume that 
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management is essentially time invariant (for example, Melitz, 2003), so analyzing when 
and where this is a good approximation is important. 
 
Multiple sectors.  We have focused here on management practices in manufacturing, but 
most questions can be applied across other areas of the economy. We are already 
collecting management data with Raffaella Sadun for the healthcare, retail and education 




Studying the causes and implications of variation in productivity across firms has become 
an important theme in many fields of economics including trade (e.g. Melitz, 2003), labor 
(e.g. Van Reenen, 1996), industrial organization (e.g. Hopenhayn, 1992) and 
macroeconomics (e.g. Prescott and Visscher, 1980; Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005).  
 
The patterns within our large samples of management data across firms and countries 
have led us to believe that one important explanation for the large differences in 
productivity between firms and countries — differences that cannot be readily explained 
by other factors — is variations in management practices. These are hard, but not 
impossible to measure, and we hope the methodology we have developed will be used by 
other researchers to help draw the international map of management in finer detail in new 
countries, industries and practices.  
 
From a policy perspective, several factors seem important in influencing management 
quality. Product market competition has a critical influence in increasing aggregate 
management by thinning the ranks of the badly managed. Indeed, much of the cross 
country variation in management appears to be due to the presence or absence of this tail 
of bad performers. One reason for the predominance of the US in management scores is 
that better managed firms appear to be rewarded more quickly with greater market share 
and the worse managed forced to shrink and exit. We also uncover many other policy 
relevant effects. Taxes and other distortive policies that favor family run firms appear to 
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hinder better management, while general education and multinational presence seem 
valuable in improving management practices. 
 
The patterns described here give support to many of the new theories developed to 
explain productivity dispersion, but they also pose many puzzles. So the empirical and 
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Table 1: The Management Practice Dimensions 
 
Categories Score from 1-5 based on: 
1) Introduction of Modern 
manufacturing techniques 
What aspects of manufacturing have been formally introduced, including just-in-time delivery 
from suppliers, autonomation, flexible manpower, support systems, attitudes and behavior? 
2) Rationale for introduction of 
Modern manufacturing techniques 
Were modern manufacturing techniques adopted just because others were using them, or are 
they linked to meeting business objectives like reducing costs and improving quality? 
3) Process problem documentation Are process improvements made only when problems arise, or are they actively sought out for 
continuous improvement as part of a normal business processes? 
4) Performance tracking Is tracking ad hoc and incomplete, or is performance continually tracked and communicated 
to all staff? 
5) Performance review Is performance reviewed infrequently and only on a success/failure scale, or is performance 
reviewed continually with an expectation of continuous improvement?  
6) Performance dialogue In review/performance conversations, to what extent is the purpose, data, agenda, and follow-
up steps (like coaching) clear to all parties? 
7) Consequence management To what extent does failure to achieve agreed objectives carry consequences, which can 
include retraining or reassignment to other jobs? 
8) Target balance Are the goals exclusively financial, or is there a balance of financial and non-financial targets? 
9) Target interconnection Are goals based on accounting value, or are they based on shareholder value in a way that 
works through business units and ultimately is connected to individual performance 
expectations? 
10) Target time horizon Does top management focus mainly on the short term, or does it visualize short-term targets 
as a “staircase” toward the main focus on long-term goals?  
11) Targets are stretching Are goals too easy to achieve, especially for some “sacred cows” areas of the firm, or are 
goals demanding but attainable for all parts of the firm?  
12) Performance clarity Are performance measures ill-defined, poorly understood, and private, or are they well-
defined, clearly communicated, and made public? 
13) Managing human capital To what extent are senior managers evaluated and held accountable for attracting, retaining, 
and developing talent throughout the organization? 
14) Rewarding high-performance To what extent are people in the firm rewarded equally irrespective of performance level, or is 
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performance clearly related to accountability and rewards? 
15) Removing poor performers Are poor performers rarely removed, or are they retrained and/or moved into different roles or 
out of the company as soon as the weakness is identified? 
16) Promoting high performers Are people promoted mainly on the basis of tenure, or does the firm actively identify, develop 
and promote its top performers?  
17) Attracting human capital Do competitors offer stronger reasons for talented people to join their companies, or does a 
firm provide a wide range of reasons to encourage talented people to join?  
18) Retaining human capital Does the firm do relatively little to retain top talent, or do whatever it takes to retain top talent 
when they look likely to leave? 
 
Note:  Full set of questions that are asked to score each dimension are included in Bloom and Van Reenen (2006).
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Australia 2.99 3.27 2.96 2.76 382 
Brazil 2.69 2.81 2.68 2.60 559 
Canada 3.13 3.35 3.02 3.02 344 
China 2.64 2.72 2.53 2.66 524 
France 3.00 3.28 2.98 2.78 312 
Germany 3.18 3.40 3.24 2.95 336 
Great Britain 2.98 3.16 2.93 2.88 762 
Greece 2.65 2.90 2.56 2.50 171 
India 2.65 2.62 2.66 2.67 620 
Italy 2.99 2.98 2.80 2.73 194 
Japan 3.15 3.20 3.25 2.90 188 
Northern Ireland 2.91 3.01 2.84 2.86 92 
Poland 2.88 2.88 2.93 2.85 231 
Portugal 2.79 3.07 2.72 2.61 140 
Republic of Ireland 2.84 2.95 2.76 2.81 102 
Sweden 3.18 3.54 3.22 2.86 270 
US 3.33 3.44 3.23 3.30 695 
Average 2.94 3.09 2.91 2.84 344 
 
Note: Overall management is the average score in across all 18 questions. Monitoring management is the average 
score across questions 1 to 6 in Table 1. Targets management is the average score across questions 8 to 12. Incentives 
management is the average score across questions 7 and 13 to 18. The lowest and highest country level scores in each 




Table 3: Estimates of firm performance equations 
 


































Employee)   
0.106 
(0.014)     
%College 
Degree   
0.076 
(0.014) 
    




No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
General controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Noise Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms 3,380 3,380 3,380 2,369 524 2,298 3,627 
Observations 29,390 29,390 29,390 20,141 3,505 19,568 3,627 
 
Note: All columns estimated by OLS with standard errors are in parentheses under coefficient estimates clustered by 
firm, except for column (7) which is estimated by Probit (we report marginal effects at the sample mean). Survival is 
defined as firms who are still in operation in Spring 2009 (including if they have been taken over by another firm). 
Sample of all firms with available accounts data at some point between 2000 and 2008. Management score has a mean 
of 2.973 and a standard-deviation of 0.664. “Country and industry dummies” includes a full set of 17 country and 
162 SIC 3-digit dummies. “General controls” comprise of firm-level controls for ln(average hours worked) and 
ln(firm age). “Noise controls” are 78 interviewer dummies, the seniority and tenure of the manager who responded, the 
day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of the day the interview was conducted, the duration of the 
interviews and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. All regressions include a 
full set of time dummies. “Management” is the firm-level management score. “% College Degree” is the share of 
employees with a college degree (collected from the survey). “Profitability” is ROCE which is “Return on Capital 
Employed” and “Sales growth” is the 5-year growth of sales. Survival is equal to zero if a firm exited due to 
bankruptcy/liquidation by the end of 2008 and one otherwise. 
a marginal effect and standard error multiplied by 100. The sample mean of non-survival is 2.64% so the marginal 
effect of -0.53 implies one management point is associated with 20.1% (=0.53/2.64) lower exit rate. 
 
Source: Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009) 
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2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4
Management scores, from 1 (worst practice) to 5 (best practice)
Note: Averages taken across all firms within each country. 5,850 observations in total. Firms per country in the right column
Source: Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009)
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Firm level average management scores, from 1 (worst practice) to 5 (best practice)
Note: Bars are the histogram of the actual density. The line is the smoothed (kernel) of the US density for comparison. Sourthern 
Europe combines Greece and Portugal. Source: Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009)
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World Bank Employment Rigidity Index
Note: World Bank index from the Doing Business database, http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/EmployingWorkers/
Source: Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009)
Figure 4: Ownership and management scores
Distribution of firm management scores by ownership. Overlaid dashed line is the kernel density for 
dispersed shareholders, the most common US ownership type
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Source: Bloom, Genakos, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009)
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